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Essays on Labor and  
Public Economics
Adam Isen
My dissertation focuses on issues in labor and public eco-
nomics. It comprises three chapters that are broadly unified 
by their examination of policy relevant topics.  
Chapter 1
Dying to Know: Are Workers Paid Their 
Marginal Product?
In the first chapter, I explore how workers’ compensa-
tion relates to their marginal product, a subject central to our 
understanding of how labor markets work.1 Theoretical inter-
est in the topic is longstanding. Near the turn of the previous 
century, John Bates Clark (1899) and Knut Wicksell (1906) 
helped lay the foundation for the neoclassical framework in 
which profit-maximizing firms set the marginal product of 
labor equal to its competitively set price. A long and varied 
stream of theoretical papers has since been developed that 
deviates from this simple picture. In some theories, the simple 
neoclassical result holds across the lifecycle, but the marginal 
product may not equate the wage in any given period because 
of firm-specific productivity or incentive issues (Becker 
1962; Lazear 1979). Other theories, such as monopsony or 
search models, posit that firms possess wage-setting power 
and therefore pay workers below their marginal product 
(Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; Robinson 1933). Despite the 
fundamental relevance of the subject in distinguishing among 
different models of the labor market, the empirical literature 
is limited.
A significant challenge to identifying how the marginal 
product of labor relates to worker pay is finding exogenous 
variation in the amount of labor employed by firms. Firms’ 
decisions over the amount of labor to hire is endogenous to 
productivity shocks (e.g., firms hire in response to changing 
market conditions). I overcome this challenge by exploit-
ing variation in labor induced by the death of a worker from 
accidental causes. Accidental deaths, such as motor vehicle 
fatalities, are an appealing source of variation because they 
are plausibly (conditionally) random to firm performance 
over time, unexpected, and almost all near-instantaneous. 
Under certain assumptions that I discuss in the chapter, I can 
use this variation to estimate workers’ marginal products and 
compare it to the price of their labor.
I investigate how the death of a worker from accidental 
causes impacts firm revenue and costs. If these workers 
were paid their marginal product, by definition, revenue will 
change by the same amount as costs, holding all else con-
stant. If the workers were paid below (above) their marginal 
product, revenue will drop more (less) than costs. Focusing 
on small firms, I test whether the reduction in firm costs fol-
lowing an employee’s death is equal to the reduction in firm 
revenue. Neoclassical theory implies that they are equal, and 
I can compare my results to this benchmark (in addition to 
investigating other theories of the labor market).
I bring novel data to bear on this question. Detailed 
employer-employee data are necessary for the analysis, 
and I link together data on two-thirds of U.S. workers and 
firms. Worker and firm payroll data from the Longitudinal 
Employer Household Dynamics data set is merged to firm 
revenue and assets data from business tax returns filed 
with the IRS. These confidential data are then linked with 
restricted Vital Statistics Multiple Cause of Death data to 
infer the cause of death for workers who died in the sample 
period. Finally, I merge in the Economic Census for addi-
tional data on firm financials.
My results indicate that a death from accidental causes 
brings about an immediate drop in firm employment, and that 
it takes two years for firms to return to their prior employ-
ment levels. Firms experience both a drop in labor costs 
and revenue, but revenue goes down more, allowing me to 
reject the null hypothesis that workers are paid their marginal 
product. This result is robust to adding detailed industry by 
geographic controls, limiting the analysis to specific sub-
groups of accidental deaths (e.g., excluding accidents that 
occurred during work), exploiting variation from the death 
of workers who earn different amounts of compensation, and 
other robustness checks. Further, there is no differential trend 
in any outcome variable before the accidental death occurs 
(although pre-trends are found for firms that lose employees 
to other causes of death). More generally, I find evidence that 
the occurrence of an accidental death is conditionally random 
to firm characteristics.
Other firm inputs must be held constant in order to 
calculate the marginal product of labor. Consistent with 
the hypothesis that an accidental death does not alter other 
firm financial decisions, no evidence is found for an effect 
on firm assets, which include a measure of physical capital. 
I then investigate more directly the effect of an accidental 
death on other firm costs that do not appear in the main data. 
Using confidential data from the Economic Census, I find 
no evidence for an effect on nonlabor costs (such as capital, 
materials, and rent). Finally, while measures of corporate 
taxes and employee benefits are missing from the main data, 
I take these costs into account under various scenarios.2 Once 
these adjustments are made, the null hypothesis of equality 
between the marginal product and compensation can still be 
rejected, and the results suggest that workers are on average 
paid no more than 85 percent of their marginal product.
I then explore some of the potential mechanisms that may 
underlie this finding. There are multiple theoretical models 
that are consistent with workers being paid below their mar-
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ginal product. Firms may have wage-setting power because 
of classical monopsony (a single or small number of employ-
ers facing many sellers of labor), heterogeneous preferences 
of individuals for different types of work, moving costs, or 
search frictions arising from imperfect information about 
other jobs. I test different predictions of these models regard-
ing variation in the degree to which workers are underpaid 
relative to their marginal product (by parsing the impact of 
an accidental death across these potential sources of het-
erogeneity). This suggestive analysis finds some evidence 
consistent with models of search frictions and moving costs.
I subsequently turn to examine a class of theories that 
relates to the determinants of pay relative to marginal prod-
ucts over the life cycle.3 In the Becker (1962) model, firms 
bear at least some of the cost of the investment in work-
ers’ human capital and therefore pay more-tenured workers 
below their marginal product in order to recoup this cost. 
On the other hand, the implicit contracts theoretical litera-
ture following Lazear (1979) posits that in order to a solve a 
shirking problem, more-tenured workers are paid above their 
marginal product and less-tenured workers are paid below. 
I test these sharply contrasting predictions and find that 
more-tenured workers are underpaid relative to less-tenured 
workers, suggesting that the evidence is more consistent with 
the Becker model than the Lazear model.
Beyond the theoretical interest, the subject of workers’ 
marginal product and pay is prominent in various empirical 
debates, including the debate over interindustry wage dif-
ferentials (Murphy and Topel 1987; Krueger and Summers 
1989; Gibbons and Katz 1992). Central to the interindustry 
wage differentials debate is the question of whether pay 
disparities across sectors reflect underlying differences in 
marginal products (as opposed to other factors). Motivated 
by empirical evidence from this debate and the evidence on 
wage dispersion more generally that seemingly similar work-
ers are paid different amounts across firms and industries 
(Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999), there is a presump-
tion that workers may not (always) be paid their marginal 
product. But while an extensive empirical literature exists 
on how workers’ pay relates to their marginal product, it is 
limited, inconclusive, and often indirect (see Ashenfelter, 
Farber, and Ransom [2010] for recent papers on the topic). 
To my knowledge, this is the first study to directly estimate 
the marginal product of labor while using quasi-experimental 
variation.4 
Finally, there are important policy implications that arise 
from the subject of this chapter, namely those that relate to 
government’s proper role in labor markets. For example, 
both the effectiveness of labor market interventions (such as 
the minimum wage, job tax credits, etc.) and the efficiency of 
human capital investment (and the extent to which govern-
ment should subsidize it) are informed by the degree to 
which workers are paid their marginal product.5
Chapter 2
Do Local Fiscal Spillovers Exist? Evidence from 
Counties, Municipalities, and School Districts
In the second chapter, I explore how the fiscal deci-
sions of one jurisdiction influence the fiscal decisions of its 
neighbors. A fundamental question about governments is 
to what extent they are influenced by one another. A large 
theoretical literature presumes interactions and has identified 
several pathways by which fiscal spillovers operate (such 
as via interjurisdictional tax competition, where the concern 
to attract and retain businesses and residents can induce 
jurisdictions to compete among themselves over their level 
of taxes and benefits).6 A key empirical issue in this theo-
retical literature is to what degree do the fiscal decisions of 
one jurisdiction influence its neighbors’ fiscal decisions. Are 
they of a large magnitude, or are they small or nonexistent? 
A failure to find any effect would raise questions about the 
importance of those theoretical channels. In this chapter, I 
empirically explore this question of fiscal spillovers on the 
local level.
There are several challenges to identifying the effect of 
fiscal spillovers. Unobserved determinants of fiscal deci-
sions might be correlated across neighbors, and neighbors’ 
decisions are jointly determined in equilibrium. To provide a 
strong research design that addresses these challenges, I col-
lect a new data set. In Ohio, local governments often require 
the explicit approval of voters to raise taxes. My data set 
consists of tens of thousands of these tax referenda that are 
economically significant and span multiple types of govern-
ment and tax instruments. The elections for tax increases 
lend themselves to a regression discontinuity design that 
exploits the underlying continuity in jurisdiction character-
istics around the threshold for measure approval to produce 
approximate random assignment.7
I examine whether jurisdictions respond to exogenous 
referendum passage by their neighbors. The analysis covers 
counties, municipalities, and school districts; and bonds, 
income tax, property tax, and sales tax measures. I first 
explore the issue graphically to determine whether there is 
evidence of any discontinuous jumps at the threshold for 
voter approval and then run formal econometric analyses. 
The results indicate no evidence that spillovers exist for 
any jurisdictional type or revenue source. Plots yield no jump 
in the dependent variables at the threshold for voter approval. 
Formal analyses never find a statistically significant effect, 
and the estimates are reasonably precise. The main measure 
of neighborliness is spatial proximity (i.e., where I test for 
the existence of spillovers), and the results are robust to 
alternative ways of defining neighbors. The results are also 
robust to focusing only on the largest of measures as well 
as limiting the analysis to geographic areas where spillovers 
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are most likely to be present. Lastly, no effect of referendum 
passage on mobility or sorting is found. The results therefore 
call into question theoretical models that presume spillovers 
and suggest any distortions (or efficiency-enhancing effects) 
possibly generated by fiscal spillovers are small. 
Chapter 3 
Child Schooling and Parental Behavior: 
Evidence from the Head Start Impact Study
The final chapter of my dissertation, written jointly with 
Alexander Gelber, addresses how government investment 
in children influences parents’ own investment in their 
children. In analyzing the return to schooling, it is possible 
to distinguish the direct impact that schooling programs 
have on children from the indirect impact that is mediated 
through the effect that schooling has on parent investment 
in children. If parents have large impacts on their children, 
these indirect effects may be important.8 A priori, we do 
not know the sign of these indirect effects: schooling inputs 
could encourage or crowd out parent inputs. Furthermore, 
the degree to which government inputs cause parent inputs 
to increase or decrease helps to determine the efficiency of 
government expenditure on schooling: many believe that 
government-provided schooling may supplant parents’ role 
to some extent. As Becker and Tomes (1976) write in their 
theoretical analysis of crowd-out of parent investment by 
public expenditure: “Compensatory responses of parents 
apparently greatly weaken the effects of . . . some Head Start 
programs.”9 If investment in children is costly to parents, 
then estimating the impact of schooling programs on parents’ 
investment is also relevant to a full welfare analysis of the 
programs. Despite the importance of these questions, there 
is little empirical work in economics on how schooling pro-
grams impact parents’ effort investment in children. 
The Head Start Impact Study (HSIS) represents a prom-
ising setting for investigating this issue in the context of 
Head Start (HS). HS is a government program that provides 
preschool to low-income children. Like many schooling 
programs, one specific goal of HS is to increase parent 
involvement with their children. First-time applicants to 
HS for the fall of 2002 were randomly selected by HSIS for 
access to HS.10 HSIS followed the children and their parents 
for several subsequent years, collecting information on a 
variety of child and parent outcomes both during and after 
the preschool years (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 2010). 
We find that in response to children’s HS access, par-
ents are substantially and statistically significantly more 
involved with their children along a wide variety of dimen-
sions, particularly along those dimensions that appear to be 
investments in child human capital.11 For example, parents 
read to their children more often, and for a longer amount 
of time at each sitting, when their children have access to 
HS than when they do not. Interestingly, even after children 
are no longer attending HS, their parents appear to invest 
more in them. This stands in striking contrast to work on the 
impact of HS on test scores, which finds that HS has positive 
effects on test scores while children are enrolled in HS but 
that these test score gains may quickly “fade” (Currie and 
Thomas 1995; U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices 2010). When we use access to HS as an instrument for 
HS enrollment, we find that the point estimates of the mean 
increase in parent investment in children is 15 percent of a 
standard deviation while children are in their preschool years 
and 6 percent of a standard deviation after their preschool 
years. These findings on parent involvement during and after 
the experiment constitute the core of the chapter. Our results 
show that HS is successful in its goal of increasing parent 
involvement with children. 
Intriguingly, we find that across HS programs, those pro-
grams that raised children’s cognitive test scores more also 
tended to increase parents’ involvement with their children. 
We discuss a variety of mechanisms that may be consistent 
with this and our main findings, including the possibility 
that HS programs that are particularly effective in raising 
children’s cognitive scores also tend to be particularly effec-
tive in raising parent involvement, as well as the possibility 
that HS impacts parent involvement in part because parents 
perceive their involvement to be complementary with child 
schooling in the production of child qualities. We present a 
simple model that captures these potential explanations for 
the observed effects.
Despite the fact that test score gains fade after HS ends, 
there is evidence that HS does have impacts on long-run 
child outcomes (Deming 2009; Garces, Thomas, and Currie 
2002; Ludwig and Miller 2007). The reemergence of school-
ing impacts on children in later life, despite the finding of 
fading gains, has also been noted in other contexts (e.g., 
Chetty et al. 2011; Dynarski, Hyman, and Schanzenbach 
2011; Heckman et al. 2010). It is possible that persistent 
increases in parent investment constitute a channel through 
which the long-run impact on child outcomes is mediated.
Notes
1. Marginal product is used in lieu of the term marginal revenue 
product, although formally speaking, marginal product refers 
to the change in physical output whereas marginal revenue 
product (my outcome of interest) refers to a change in actual 
revenue. Marginal product multiplied by marginal revenue 
equals the marginal revenue product.
2.  Any change in profits is moderated by corporate taxes. Results 
on benefits using the Economic Census indicate a negative 
effect, but one that is lower than is found for payroll.
3. This also has implications for some of the potential 
mechanisms.
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4. The word direct is used in the sense that I explicitly estimate 
how a change in employee labor impacts revenue (the approxi-
mate partial derivative of revenue with respect to labor). This 
language is used to differentiate the approach from one that 
estimates a parameter other than the marginal product of labor 
that tests implications of relevant models or with theory can 
be used to recover the marginal product (e.g., estimating the 
correlation between firm concentration and wages or the labor 
supply curve facing an individual firm).
5. This is but a small list of examples. In the latter example, 
individual decisions over the amount of human capital in which 
to invest (such as schooling and job training) are efficient if the 
returns to the investment are fully captured by workers. This is 
not the case if workers are paid below their marginal product, 
which would therefore likely justify government involvement. 
6. This fiscal competition, depending on the model, can lead to 
suboptimally low levels of public goods, or so-called races to 
the bottom, but it can also lead to efficient levels of public good 
provision (Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Oates and Schwab 
1988; Wilson 1986; and Zodrow and Mieszkowksi 1986). In 
another type of fiscal spillover, known as yardstick competition, 
residents use the fiscal decisions of neighboring jurisdictions as 
a benchmark for their own jurisdiction to correct an informa-
tion asymmetry between themselves and politicians about the 
cost of public good provision (Besley and Case 1995). To dis-
tinguish between good and bad elected officials, voters examine 
whether their tax rates are higher than in surrounding jurisdic-
tions, which constrains the tax setting behavior of politicians 
who wish to be reelected. Conventional spillovers might arise 
where residents of one jurisdiction consume, whether in a tan-
gible way or not, the public goods of another jurisdiction. The 
last source of spillovers is Tiebout resorting, where individuals 
move in response to a particular fiscal change to better match 
their public good preferences. 
7. The prior empirical literature on fiscal spillovers has grown 
in recent years. Relative to the previous studies, the main 
innovation in this chapter is to use a regression discontinu-
ity design that plausibly isolates exogenous variation in taxes 
and spending. Most studies in the literature test for spillovers 
by instrumenting for neighbor fiscal behavior using neighbor 
characteristics, such as demographics, as well as neighbor lags, 
in taxes and spending. Papers have examined strategic fiscal 
behavior among countries, states, municipalities, and school 
districts. The empirical literature has tended to find large posi-
tive spillovers across jurisdictions, and I replicate those results 
with my data using neighbor characteristics as instruments.
8. Indeed, parenting is often thought to play an important role 
in explaining differences in child outcomes across racial and 
socioeconomic status groups. Randomized control trials of 
efforts to involve parents in children’s lives have often found 
positive impacts on children, including on children’s cognitive 
scores (Nye, Turner, and Schwartz 2006).
9. This was the source of debate between Becker and Tomes 
(1976) and Goldberger (1985), who the latter of whom 
points out that parents could increase investment in children 
in response to schooling programs. Becker and Tomes also 
write that “Government programs may have effects [on parent 
behavior] by changing rates of return on parent investments in 
children . . . However, we have emphasized the redistribution 
effects of many programs—including Head Start programs . . .  
because the redistribution effects are clear, while effects [due 
to changing the marginal rate of return] are not clear, even in 
direction . . . ” By redistribution effects, Becker and Tomes are 
referring to the compensatory responses of parents that could 
cause a decrease in parent investment in response to an increase 
in child schooling. The related model of Peltzman (1973) 
predicts that private education expenditures are decreased by 
public expenditure on higher education. 
10. The HSIS randomly assigned a sample of 3–4-year-old HS 
applicants either to the HS group or to the control group. The 
HS group was allowed to enroll in HS at the HS center to 
which they applied, while the control group was not granted 
access to HS at that center (but may have received similar 
services through other available programs chosen by their 
parents—in occasional cases through other HS centers).
11. By parent involvement we mean activities that parents 
undertake that require time or effort and directly involve their 
children. 
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